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No. 91-453
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1991
DAVID H. LUCAS,
Petitioner,
V.
SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL,
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari
To the South Carolina Supreme Court
BRIEF OF THE INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE AS
AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS
This brief is submitted by the Institute for Justice as amicus curiae.
We have secured the consent of both parties to the filing of this brief and
letters of consent have been filed with the clerk. The Institute supports
the position of the petitioner in this case and urges reversal of the deci-
sion of the South Carolina Supreme Court.
The Institute for Justice is a non-profit, public interest legal founda-
tion litigating and educating in the areas of economic liberty, property
rights, and the First Amendment. One of the pillars of the Institute's
program is securing full constitutional protection for private property
rights threatened by government regulation.
The instant case could have a profound impact on the regulation of
property throughout the country. Therefore, it directly implicates the
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Institute's mission. Furthermore, the Institute believes that the analysis
of a noted authority on property and takings law contained in this brief
will assist the Court in addressing the constitutional issues involved in
the case.
CONDENSED STATEMENT OF FACTS AND SUMMARY OF
PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The complete statement of facts and the history of this litigation
have already been presented by both parties. This brief summary of them
is designed to highlight those facts and legal determinations that we be-
lieve are critical to the proper understanding and disposition of the case.
The plaintiff, David H. Lucas, purchased two undeveloped water-
front lots, Numbers 22 and 24, in the Wild Dunes development on the
Isle of the Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina in December,
1986, paying $455,000 for lot 22 and $500,000 for lot 24. Lucas bor-
rowed $900,000 toward the purchase price from the North Carolina Na-
tional Bank, secured by a mortgage on the two lots. At the time of the
purchase both lots were zoned for single-family home development, and
a similar home had at that time been built on lot 23, located between the
two Lucas' lots, and on other similar lots along the beach. About eight-
een months after purchase, Lucas' proposed development of the lots was
thwarted by the Beachfront Management Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 48-39-
10 et seq. 1988 (hereinafter BMA), passed by the South Carolina legisla-
ture on July 1, 1988 (Act 634), and administered by the State's Coastal
Council. The BMA prohibited all new construction between the beach
and certain setback lines. BMA § 280(A). The BMA also prohibited the
reconstruction of existing houses that had been destroyed. One of the
objects of the statute is to promote a "gradual retreat from the [coastal]
system over a forty-year period." BMA § 280.
One immediate consequence of the BMA was to permanently de-
prive Lucas of the ability to use the property for its intended purpose, the
construction of a single family home. South Carolina did not wrest from
Lucas' possession of the land; nor did it deprive him of the power to sell
the land, subject of course to the restrictions imposed by the BMA. The
statute also allowed Lucas to use his property for recreational purposes
(picnics and outings), and to pitch tents or erect other temporary struc-
tures on the land. Trial Transcript (hereinafter Tr. Trans.) at 16-25; 91-
98. The BMA did not, however, relieve Lucas of any of the potential
liabilities of a landowner, or of the taxes he had to pay on the land.
South Carolina claimed that Lucas' two lots retained some residual value
because he was allowed to make some limited use of them under the
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BMA. Lucas testified that the lots had negative value because the value
of the residual uses was lower than the cost of the liability insurance, and
the real estate taxes remained unabated. (Tr. Trans. at 31.)
The trial judge found that the property had no market value after
the imposition of the regulation, and that the regulation worked a "total
taking of Lucas' two beach front lots." (Order of Trial Judge at 130.)
He found Lucas is "entitled under both the State and Federal Constitu-
tions to the payment of just compensation." Id. He further concluded
that "since the State has totally acquired Lucas's property, it is entitled
to a deed to the property free and clear of any encumbrances," a total
condemnation of the property. Id. Accordingly, he ordered the state to
pay: (1) compensation equal to the full market value of the lots without
the restriction (which he found to be $585,000 per lot), (2) the real estate
taxes paid on the property from the time the BMA went into effect, and
(3) interest on the mortgage, for a total of $1,232,387.50, plus interest
from the date of judgment. Id.
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the decision below and
held that the regulations in question did not constitute a taking, even if
they did wipe out the entire value of the property in question. Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 898 (S.C. 1991). In the
view of the South Carolina Supreme Court, the regulation in question
was, as the plaintiff admitted below, a valid exercise of the police power.
The Court therefore allowed the state to impose the regulation without
compensation. In its view Lucas made a fatal concession by acknowledg-
ing that the BMA "is properly designed to preserve the extremely valua-
ble resource which is South Carolina's beaches." Id. at 896. From this,
the South Carolina Supreme Court held that Lucas conceded "the valid-
ity of the legislative declaration of its 'findings' and 'policy,'" id. at 896,
and conceded that "discouraging new construction in close proximity to
the beach/dune area is necessary to prevent great public harm." Id. at
898. The Court deemed itself "bound by these uncontested legislative
findings." Id. It then rejected Lucas' contention that so long as the
landowner has been deprived of "'all economically viable use' of his
property, it has worked a 'taking' for which compensation is due, regard-
less of any other consideration." Id.
In a strong dissenting opinion, Judge Harwell refused to accept the
proposition that South Carolina could regulate property to "oblivion"
and found that while the taking was permissible for a public purpose, it
was not designed to prevent any nuisance or noxious activities on the
plaintiff's land, and that therefore compensation was required. Id. at
906.
1238 [Vol. 25:1233
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Amicus curiae urges this Court to reverse the decision of the South
Carolina Supreme Court and to restore the condemnation award made
by the trial judge below. In our view, the case should be understood as a
standard takings case in which the state has deprived its owner of one of
the indispensable attributes of ownership, the ordinary use of the prop-
erty so owned. In reaching this conclusion, ownership should not be un-
derstood simply as the bare possession of a physical object, but as a set of
complete and well defined rights over the property. As repeated deci-
sions of this Court have recognized, ownership includes the right to pos-
session, use, and disposition of the property in question, and that takings
can occur even when the original owner of the property has been left, as
here, in undisturbed possession of the land whose use has been regulated.
The massive restrictions on use in this case thus amount to a prima
facie taking, which the state has to justify or provide compensation. In
dealing with this question of justification, it is critical to distinguish, as
the South Carolina Supreme Court did not, between two separate ques-
tions of takings jurisprudence: (1) whether the taking was for public use,
and (2) whether the taking was justified under the police power. The
radically different nature of these two inquiries is well revealed by the
consequences that are attached to each. If the state cannot show that a
taking is for public use, then it cannot proceed by the eminent domain
power, but must (unless its actions be ultra vires) proceed by voluntary
purchase. But if the public use requirement alone is satisfied, the taking
can only go forward if just compensation is paid.
The police power functions in a wholly separate fashion-as a justi-
fication for taking the property, or for restricting its use without compen-
sation-and can be established only by meeting requirements more
stringent than those necessary to establish a public use, namely that the
landowner's intended use of the property has caused or threatens to
cause, a nuisance (public or private) which is appropriately neutralized
by the land use restriction. Any broader conception of the police power
allows the state, as agent of its citizens, to take without compensation
property that the citizens themselves would have to purchase from the
landowner.
The decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court is fatally flawed
because, far from observing the structural distinction between public use
and police power, the Court treated the two different conceptions as
identical. South Carolina has advanced a large number of justifications
for its stringent restriction on land use; some of these go to the protection
of the beach against erosion, BMA § 250 (2)-(6). These provisions pre-
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vent potential nuisances which, in principle, South Carolina should be
able to prevent without the payment of compensation. Yet other justifi-
cations in the BMA, such as the promotion of tourism, and for the lei-
sure of South Carolina citizens, BMA § 250(1)(b), (d), only identify
public uses for which Lucas's land may be taken with just compensation.
Lucas conceded below that the BMA amounted to a "laudable goal."
Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 896. The court erred by interpreting this statement
to be a concession that his planned beachfront home should be treated as
a nuisance or other noxious activity that South Carolina may restrain
without compensation. This error arose from the court's failure to make
the proper terminological distinctions.
Once the relevant distinctions become clear, the decision of the
South Carolina Supreme Court should be reversed, but on a theory that
is different from that on which the plaintiff requests relief. In his petition
for certiorari, the plaintiff inexplicably disclaims the theory on which the
trial judge entered a decision in his favor by insisting: "This petition
does not concern the exercise of eminent domain. Petitioner concedes
that no permanent physical occupation occurred here." (Petition for
Certiorari at 5.) The absence of the physical occupation only shows that
the case raises the issue of a regulatory, or partial taking, not that takings
issues are absent. The massive restriction on land use, whether or not
total, amounts to a taking of the property for which compensation is
required in the absence of justification. South Carolina here has not of-
fered any justification to show how the elimination of the construction on
this property advances its legitimate end of controlling the erosion of the
beachfront, which rests in public hands. South Carolina has been pre-
pared to appropriate $10,000,000 to the maintenance of the public
beaches. (Tr. Trans. at 69.) If it wishes to expand the area of undevel-
oped land, it is free to do so, as long as it pays the owner the market
value of the property. It is not sufficient to allow South Carolina to regu-
late because it wants to do so. "[A] strong public desire to improve the
public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a
shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change." Penn-
sylvania Coal v. Mahon Co., 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (per Holmes, J.),
quoted by the dissent in Lucas, 404 S.E.2d, at 903.
1240 [Vol. 25:1233
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ARGUMENT
I. ANY RESTRICTION ON THE ORDINARY USE OF PROPERTY
IMPOSED BY THE STATE IS A PARTIAL REGULATORY
TAKING FOR WHICH COMPENSATION IS
REQUIRED UNLESS A POLICE POWER
JUSTIFICATION IS ESTABLISHED.
It is well recognized that property constitutes more than permanent
physical objects that are the subject of external sensation. Instead private
property refers to the complex of rights over a particular thing that the
owner of that property enjoys against the entire world. The ordinary
conception of property thus embraces far more than the right to naked
possession of real property, and the associated right to exclude all other
persons. It embraces the right to make ordinary use of the property in
question, and to dispose of it by sale, lease, mortgage or other forms of
voluntary exchange. Definitions of this sort have been recognized from
every source. The standard dictionary definitions all embrace the three
elements of possession, use, and disposition;1 the definition is part and
parcel of the accounts of property that are used by common lawyers2 and
political philosophers3 and, most critical in the evaluation of takings
cases, under the Takings Clause itself. Thus this Court has written in
United States v. General Motors as follows:
The critical terms [of the takings clause] are "property,"
"taken" and "just compensation." It is conceivable that the
first was used in its vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical
thing with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recog-
nized by the law. On the other hand, it may have been em-
ployed in a more accurate sense to denote the group of rights
inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the
right to possess, use and dispose of it. In point of fact, the con-
struction given the phrase has been the latter.4
Under this definition it is clear that there cannot be a watertight line
drawn between those actions of the state that allow it to enter into pos-
1. "Property: 2. Ownership or dominion; the legal right to the possession, use, enjoy-
ment and disposal of a thing; a valuable legal right or interest in or to particular things." Funk
& Wagnalls, New Comprehensive International Dictionary of the English Language 1011
(1982).
2. See A.M. Honore, "Ownership," in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 107 (1961).
3. See J. Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries (1980).
4. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945). South Carolina
law contains an identical account of ownership. See Gasque v. The Town of Conway, 194 S.C.
15, 8 S.E.2d 871 (1940).
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session, and those which regulate the way in which it is used by its pri-
vate owner. The imposition of any restriction upon use, above and
beyond those inherent in the law of nuisance, can ordinarily be done by
private parties only if they purchase a restrictive covenant over the land
in question. There is no reason in law or principle why the same individ-
uals who in their private capacity are required to purchase this interest in
land are in their public capacity allowed to take it by majority vote for
nothing. The restrictions imposed upon Lucas' use of land under the
BMA should be understood as a covenant in gross (that is, a covenant
unattached to any dominant tenement) that is held by the public at large.
It is quite sufficient for the protection of all public interests to allow the
state to do what no private owner could do: compel the surrender of the
covenant against the will of the person who owns the land. It is wholly
unnecessary, and ultimately mischievous, to give any state the additional
power to compel the surrender of the covenant without payment of any
compensation for the loss in value, great or small, that is brought about
by the restriction in question.
In his arguments throughout the case, Lucas has avoided one im-
plicit consequence of this argument. Lucas takes the position that the
regulation automatically requires full compensation where the restriction
on use results in a total loss of value, but acknowledges that South Caro-
lina is free to impose substantial restrictions on use where there is some
residual use in question. In essence, Lucas has sought to develop aper se
rule that deals with a wipe-out case but does not extend his theory to any
case of partial restrictions. This approach is conceptually inadequate be-
cause it creates a gratuitous and unprincipled conceptual gulf between
total restriction on use and massive partial restrictions.
The potential danger of Lucas' position is further revealed by a close
examination of the underlying facts of the instant case. South Carolina
introduced evidence that the value of the property was positive because
the plaintiff, in addition to retaining the rights of possession and disposi-
tion, also retained the rights to use the land for recreation and for tempo-
rary structures. (Tr. Trans. 56.) The trial judge rejected that evidence
because he believed that the market value of the property in question was
zero. But suppose he believed that the value of these residual uses in-
creased the value of the land to $9,000 or one percent of its original cost,
and a slightly smaller fraction of its present market value. Suppose also
that the trial judge found that the residual tort liability and real estate
taxes were tantamount to a lien of $8,000 on the land, leaving the prop-
erty with a net valuation of $1,000. Under these circumstances, the
proper approach is to hold that the plaintiff is entitled to the market
1242 (Vol. 25:1233
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value of the property5 less the residual value of the property in private
use.
6
Under the plaintiff's faulty approach the restriction on use would
not, or at least might not, amount to a taking. In such a case, compensa-
tion, if owed at all, would be payable under some fluid and unprincipled
balancing test. Yet if the value of the accumulated liens were $10,000
(and thus exceeded the residual value in use), the plaintiff would be enti-
tled to full compensation of the property in question. A shift of $2,000 in
the relative value of the residual uses and the ongoing tax and tort liabili-
ties should alter the level of compensation only by the same $2,000. It
should not precipitate a huge swing in the recoverability of millions of
dollars in compensation.
The proper rule is thus one of strict proportion: the greater the tak-
ing, the greater the restriction, then the greater the compensation that
must be paid. The just compensation clause should induce the state to act
responsibly in dealing with its citizens. It should not spur irresponsible
brinksmanship by public officials, whereby small differences in valuation
generate enormous differences in outcome.
II. THE MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION AFFORDS
THE PROPER MEASURE OF COMPENSATION FOR THE LOSS
IN QUESTION.
In the course of its argument at trial, the Coastal Council adopted
an alternative approach which is likely to be repeated on appeal. It urged
that the property in question was subject to a serious erosion risk, and in
fact had been under water for a substantial period of time during the past
40 years. (Tr. Trans. at 36-39.) His argument in effect, although not
reached by the South Carolina Supreme Court, was that, even if the total
restriction on use amounted to a taking, no compensation was owed be-
5. The reference to the market value reflects the current state of the Supreme Court law,
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893) (compensation only for the
market value of the property taken); United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202 (1979), and
ignores the important issue of compensation for the loss of subjective value in excess of market
value.
6. Note that if the state leaves the individual owner with net liabilities, then it should pay
compensation in excess of the fair market value. The right formula in all cases is the fair
market value of the property taken, less value of property retained. If the value of the property
equals zero, then the compensation is equal to its market value. But if the value of the prop-
erty is negative, then the compensation owed equals the market value of the property taken
plus the residual liabilities retained by the landowner. In the case at hand the trial judge
avoided these valuation difficulties by ordering Lucas to deliver deed of title to South Carolina,
thereby wiping out any residual liabilities. For the weaknesses of his approach, see Section V,
infra.
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cause the property was valueless for its intended use. No prudent person
would build in light of the unstable conditions on the South Carolina
Coast.
The chief mistake in this argument is that it eliminates the market
value test of eminent domain and substitutes a bureaucratic determina-
tion of value that reflects the self-serving desire of public officials to cre-
ate the impression that environmental regulation causes no serious
private harm. But the Coastal Council's argument overlooks the fact
that the dangers to Lucas' plot were evident to all persons who bought
and sold property on the island (Lucas himself was a native islander and
a real estate broker who had bought and sold between 1000 and 1500
properties on the island since he arrived on Palm Island in 1978-1979.
(Tr. Trans. at 32-35.) The erosion and hurricane risks were well known
to all persons who lived on the island.
The market valuations reflected the erosion risk. If that risk were
zero, then the value of the property would doubtless have been far higher
than it was. Indeed some portion of the high appreciation-by one esti-
mate, at 56 percent per annum average over a 7 year period between
1979-1986 (Tr. Trans. at 44-45.)--was attributable to the perception that
the island was "accreting" so that the risk of destruction by hurricane or
weather was reduced as the size of the island expanded. Indeed, at trial
the beach was a "football field away from the property line," which
might be regarded as "ocean view" and perhaps not as "ocean front"
property. (Tr. Trans. at 36, 38.)
Just because members of the Coastal Commission would not invest
their own money on the island does not mean that other people are fool-
ish or imprudent to do so. The market allocates resources to those per-
sons who value a given asset the most, not those who value it least. That
true market value, and not the arbitrary value assigned to it by govern-
ment bureaucrats, is the proper measure of compensation.
III. THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT DID NOT RECOGNIZE
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PUBLIC USE AND POLICE
POWER REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE JUST
COMPENSATION CLAUSE.
A. The South Carolina Supreme Court mistakenly used the generous
standards of the public use requirement to bypass the more
stringent standards under the police power.
The text of the just compensation clause contains an explicit refer-
ence to the public use requirement, but no reference at all to the police
1244 [Vol. 25:1233
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power. The cardinal mistake made by South Carolina has been to ana-
lyze the case as though there were no distinction between the public use
and the police power requirements under the clause. Yet it is imperative
to make some distinction between the two. Thus suppose that South
Carolina chooses to condemn the Lucas' property, and then to resell it at
the same cost to Lucas' neighbor on plot 23. The police power justifica-
tion is negated by the payment of compensation, so that the only un-
resolved issue is whether the taking for resale is a taking for a public use
under the rules developed in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) and
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
Even if this broad account of public use correctly identifies the occa-
sions where state coercive power may be directed against individual citi-
zens, it surely says nothing about whether compensation is owing when
the state seeks to take or to regulate. When the state takes land for use as
a highway or a post office, the presence of an unquestionable public use
does not excuse it from its duty to pay compensation to the landowner.
Or suppose, as was the case in the nineteenth century, that the state
wishes to authorize a private party to flood the land of a neighbor in
order to form a reservoir sufficient to operate a mill. See Head v. Amos-
keag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885). Even though this Court held this tak-
ing was for a public purpose, the private party responsible for the
flooding had to pay for the damage caused on land that was not occu-
pied. Compensation and public use are determined by radically different
tests.
The test for a public use today is any form of public benefit from the
government action undertaken. But what about the police power? Here
the traditional conception of the police power was tied to the commission
of a common law nuisance, a point conceded by the South Carolina
Supreme Court in Lucas itself. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 899. It might seem
odd at first blush that the limits of state power to regulate could be deter-
mined, even in part, by the common law conceptions of nuisance that
have been developed over the centuries in such radically different con-
texts. But the intimate historical connection between the law of nuisance
and the proper scope of the police power remains in principle as vital and
important today as it has ever been. In the private context, the defendant
who creates a nuisance can be shut down without compensation, and
without the need to purchase a restrictive covenant. Instead the owner of
the private property must purchase the easement to cause damages. Nui-
sance law thus determines when one neighbor must compensate another
for the restrictions imposed on the use of property. That is precisely the
June 1992] 1245
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same question that is asked when "the community" (a group of many
neighbors) seeks to impose restrictions on some of its members.
The tests to determine what constitutes a nuisance at common law
are often complex. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 825ff. Thus
normally a physical invasion is required, be it of smells, fluids, dust,
gasses and the like. See, e.g., Bamford v. Turnley, 3 B & S, 67, 83, 122
Eng. Rep. 27, 32-3 (Ex. 1862) (Bramwell, B.). Yet in some instances low
level nuisances are not regarded as actionable. under the "live and let
live" rule. In other circumstances, noninvasive conduct is regarded as a
nuisance, as with the obligations of lateral support. See, e.g., Corporation
of Birmingham v. Allen, L.R. 6 Ch. D. 284 (C.A. 1877) for an exception-
ally clear statement of the relevant rules. In each of these cases the ob-
jective of the law is to resolve conflicts in ways that maximize the joint
value of all resources owned by the parties to the dispute. And the rules
of common law nuisance do that better than any alternative set of rules.
Would neighboring landowners really prefer to be in an initial position in
which none could develop property without the consent of all neighbors?
Would they prefer to be in a position in which all are required to pay
compensation for the trivial and repetitive nuisances that each inflicts on
the other? Would they prefer to allow each to dig to the boundary of the
land even though the land, natural growth, and houses on the adjacent
plot may be damaged? In each case the set of mutual restrictions works
to the benefit of both parties subject to the regulation.
When these rules are carried over to the law of eminent domain,
their force cannot be gutted simply by a legislative determination that
certain conduct is a nuisance, without any proof thereof. The entire
structure of the just compensation clause would be frittered away if the
state could take what it pleases when it pleases simply by declaring the
prohibited use a "nuisance." This Court has never tolerated so casual
and slippery a conception of nuisance in the first amendment area. Un-
supported legislative declarations that certain forms of conduct are a nui-
sance are without constitutional weight. See Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). The state must show, in accordance
with traditional common law rules, that the noise and inconveniences
caused by certain activities do rise to the level of common law public
nuisance. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). Certainly the legis-
lature could not get around the prohibitions against taking by declaring
X to be Y's debtor, and then allowing Y to collect the sum in question by
an ordinary common law action. At every point the manipulation of
common law categories must meet the tests of judicial scrutiny.
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The legislature cannot evade its constitutional obligations by resort-
ing to creative redefinitions. This single, but vital limitation on legisla-
tive power explains why the common law nuisance is an indispensable
ingredient of the law of takings. The great difficulties with takings arise
when individuals abandon the private remedies that they have against
their neighbor and seek to obtain redress through the political process.
In any constitutional system, the critical element is to make sure that
political opportunism is not the reason for the resort to the political pro-
cess. Thus if A and B by agreement between themselves could not con-
demn the property of C for their own use, then what additional powers
should they obtain by appealing (in a three person society) to a 2 to 1
vote in the political arena? The use of the nuisance requirement means
that the majority of two cannot convert a private loss into a public vic-
tory. It prevents, therefore, an illicit shift to the public sector that might
overwhelm the system of property rights that establishes the relation of
person to person.
But it may be protested that ours is not a society of small numbers
but of millions. And so it is. Yet it is precisely for that reason that there
is greater necessity today to enforce the limitations that the just compen-
sation clause imposes on the political process. The basic inquiry has two
parts. First, there is the question of why political majorities should be
able to condemn with compensation. When we deal not with a majority
of 2, but of 2,000 or 2,000,000 persons, it is not possible for them by
unanimous voluntary agreement to coordinate their efforts to purchase
needed property from the class of persons in the position of C. The
temptation of individual citizens to free ride on their neighbors is too
great.7 Eminent domain allows the state to use its power of taxation and
deliberation to organize the coalition that purchases property with tax
revenues. Yet at the same time the just compensation clause prevents
politics from allowing an end run around the compensation requirements
normally applicable in private disputes. That additional restriction on
government should not be imposed where the private parties can on their
own initiative restrict land use without compensation. But it is required
where private actors could not restrict as of right. The nuisance law de-
termines that boundary in the private sphere, and to maintain the parity
between the two systems, it must do so in the public sphere as well. A
group that is not prepared to pay $1,000 to purchase a restrictive cove-
nant should not be allowed to get that self-same interest by spending
$500 in the political arena.
7. See Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. Legal Studies 351 (1991); M. Olson, The
Logic of Collective Action (1965).
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Private parties cannot restrict ordinary activities of landowners
without compensating them; the state under the takings clause is subject
to that same restriction. Private parties can enjoin a nuisance without
compensation; the state as their representative has the same power.'
Quite simply, no other test is available to determine when state action
requires compensation and when it does not, as this Court itself has ac-
knowledged. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104 (1978). Indeed, any test, however delicately phrased, which seeks to
answer the police power question by asking whether the restriction in
question serves some legitimate state interest collapses the fundamental
distinction between public use and police power that organizes this entire
branch of law.
B. The anti-nuisance approach to the police power allows for a
coherent analysis of the BMA that supports the anti-erosion
provisions of the statute but invalidates the building
prohibition.
The power of this general approach is revealed by a closer analysis
of the BMA. First, the BMA prevents any landowner along the beach
from "armoring" the beachfront property. BMA § 250(5). That restric-
tion should be sustained, and indeed is not challenged here. The normal
ebb and flow of the tides are allowed to do their work. The beach will
sometimes expand, at other times it will contract. But the construction
of massive bulwarks on the beach will starve it of new sand and cause
material physical damages to the beach and its long term health. In this
limited respect, therefore, the BMA enjoins a nuisance that private land-
owners could commit against their neighbors, and, more importantly,
against the public at large.9 The prohibition of this kind of activity is
appropriate by a simple test: the state is allowed to enjoin the activities
8. For one illustration of the point, see Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915),
where the Court allowed the state to enjoin the operation of a brickyard even though the
neighbors came to the nuisance only after its operation was established. That is the identical
result reached in the coming to the nuisance cases in the private law, where the injunction is
similarly allowed. See, e.g., Sturges v. Bridgman, II Ch. D. 852 (1878); Ensign v. Walls, 323
Mich. 49, 34 N.W.2d 549 (1948); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 840 C, D.
9. It is this test which explains the weakness of this Court's decision in Keystone Bitumi-
nous CoalAss'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1985). There the Court did not recognize that
the police power limitation, associated as it is with the law of nuisance, protects only strangers
to the transaction. Since the landowners in Keystone sought to recover the support easement
that they conveyed away, they should have been required to pay compensation to repurchase
the same interest that they released. If private parties are not bound by their own consent,
then the system of private property is always subject to destruction at the whim of the state.
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that, should they result in harm, would entitle it to compensation as
owner of the beach after the harm is done.
South Carolina in this case wishes to go further, and to prevent the
construction of any ordinary single family dwelling on the property in
question. But although the South Carolina Supreme Court speaks of the
object of the statute as the prevention of "serious public harm," Lucas,
404 S.E.2d, at 898, the phrase is simply conclusory. The total ban on
real estate development cannot be sustained by the arguments that justify
the anti-armoring provisions. There is no showing that the construction
of a house on a beachfront lot will increase the level of erosion of the
beach, or that it will affect the stability of the land on which neighbors
have constructed their own houses. At most South Carolina shows that
it wants to restrain the construction on that property very much. The
test that allows compensation above fails here, for if this were a private
beach, its landowner could not stop construction unrelated to the erosion
risk.
South Carolina's own stated purposes are vintage public use argu-
ments, wholly irrelevant to the more difficult task of regulation without
compensation. Thus if the state wished to take land for a highway on the
ground that it would benefit tourism and the leisure of its own citizenry,
certainly it would have to pay compensation. If it wanted to take the soil
from an adjacent landowner to nourish the beach for the benefit of tour-
ism and the leisure of its own citizenry, it would still have to pay com-
pensation. If it wants to obtain a restrictive covenant over private land
for the benefit of tourism and its own citizenry it again has to pay. There
is no enormous gulf between the justifications that are required of the
state when it occupies property and that are required of it when it re-
stricts, in whole or in part, the use of that property by a private land-
owner. Tourism and local leisure, which fail in the former case, also fail
in the latter.
The arguments just advanced differ in important ways from those
put forward by Lucas. Lucas argues that as long as the taking is total,
the question of justification need not be considered at all. Yet no bal-
anced theory of takings could be that protective of private property
against the legitimate claims of the state. If the sole use of the land-
owner's property is as a brickyard, as was the case in Hadacheck v. Se-
bastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), it seems odd to say that the question of
whether the state must compensate in order to enjoin a nuisance depends
on whether the landowner can salvage some small value from the alter-
native use of his own land. As long as there is no overbreadth in the
regulation, as long as some less restrictive alternative is not available to
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the state, then the total wipe-out is fully justified but only in a nuisance
case, just as if the private neighbors had been able to obtain an ordinary
injunction to the same effect, without the payment of compensation.
The proper analysis of the justification question thus mirrors that of
the initial takings question. There is no magic in a total (as opposed to a
partial) restriction on use; if the anti-nuisance justification supports the
injunction, then so be it. If it does not, then the state must pay for what
it takes. The reason why Lucas is entitled to the compensation awarded
by the trial judge is simple. The state did not remotely offer any anti-
nuisance justification for prohibiting the construction of the ordinary sin-
gle family home.
IV. THE REQUIREMENT THAT SOUTH CAROLINA PAY JUST
COMPENSATION IN THIS CASE FURTHERS AND DOES NOT
RETARD INSTITUTIONS OF SOUND GOVERNANCE.
The restoration of the trial court's award of full compensation to
Lucas will continue the reversal in the law of takings that was begun in
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), and First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304 (1987). Yet there is every reason to welcome the shift, not because it
protects the provincial interests of property owners against the welfare of
the public at large, but because the protection of property against depre-
dations from the state is the surest way to advance the general public
welfare.
In order to see why, it is important to remember a truth that has
been evident from Blackstone's day, namely, "the public good is in noth-
ing more essentially interested, than in the protection of every individ-
ual's private rights. . . ." 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 139 (1765).
Within that calculus the welfare of all citizens of the state has to be taken
into account, not merely of those who benefit from the restriction.
Whether the land-use restrictions of South Carolina wipe out Mr. Lucas
and people similarly situated, or cause them substantial financial loss, or
merely cause them smaller inconvenience, those losses, great or small,
count as much in the social calculus as the gain to any other person.
That each person counts for one and only one is a cardinal principle of
political philosophy and constitutional interpretation, and the claims of
landowners cannot simply be brushed aside in some headlong rush to
satisfy majority will no matter how worthy the cause.
But how are these interests to be taken into account? In effect,
South Carolina claims that it has considered all the interests, public and
private, when it has passed legislation, and that deference is afforded its
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considered judgment. But if Lucas is in the minority, what guarantee is
there that the majority has considered his interest on a par with its own?
And what possibility does this Court have of superintending the legisla-
tive process to determine whether his interest has been given its full de-
served weight in the social process? The very reason why we have a
constitution, why we have a takings clause, is because we know from
history that legislative majorities, unless constrained by judicial power,
can and will misbehave by favoring those who have political power over
those who do not. This Court cannot be a constant council of revision to
pass on the soundness of each and every piece of legislation by examining
it afresh on its merits. But where property has been taken for public use,
it can require that the state pay full compensation so that it is assured
that individual interests sacrificed receive their full measure of
protection.
Over and over again this Court has recognized that where statutes
disproportionately affect on a select group, they are constitutionally sus-
pect because they require private parties to bear in full the costs that
should in justice be borne by society as a whole. See, e.g., United States
v. Armstrong, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). The concern here is not only with
equity, but also with the preservation of the overall productive capacities
of society as a whole. If the South Carolina legislature need not compen-
sate Lucas and others similarly situated for their losses, then it will ig-
nore these costs in making the social calculus. The implicit subsidy that
this Court will confer on state legislatures will have the same deleterious
social consequences in this context that other subsidies have in other con-
texts. It will lead to excessive levels of the subsidized activity, in this
instance too much government, for too little gain. The functional pur-
pose of the takings clause is to eliminate any potential divergence be-
tween private and social costs, to knock out the subsidy that induces the
state to undertake projects that impoverish the citizenry as a whole while
benefiting some select fraction of it.
No one, least of all Lucas who lives along the beach and under-
stands its fragile nature, disputes that there should be public expendi-
tures for the maintenance of valuable and irreplaceable resources that are
now in public hands. Indeed South Carolina has already appropriated by
general bond issue $10,000,000 for the maintenance and nourishment of
the beach. Yet there is no reason to believe that the draconian sanctions
at work on Lucas provide a public benefit remotely equivalent in value to
the loss that it causes. All environmental causes are not of equal impor-
tance and of equal dignity. The one way South Carolina could prove the
importance that it attaches to adding a restrictive covenant over the Lu-
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cas land to its chain of beachfront properties is to pay for it. That is what
this Court should do by reversing the order of the South Carolina
Supreme Court and restoring the judgment of the trial court below.
V. THE REMEDY AWARDED BY THE DISTRICT COURT IS
INCORRECT BECAUSE IT DENIES THE STATE THE OPTION
OF REPEALING THE RESTRICTIONS IN QUESTION
UPON PAYMENT OF INTERIM DAMAGES
UNDER THE FIRST ENGLISH OPTION.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge, having properly
adjudged that the BMA worked a taking of Lucas' property, ordered the
state to pay full compensation in exchange for a fee interest in the prop-
erty. This rule is in error because it forces South Carolina to make enor-
mous expenditures for interests in real property which it may not wish to
acquire once its constitutional obligations are clear. Nor should this
Court believe that once it declares the restrictions in issue a taking that
South Carolina is committed to acquiring title to all of the unbuilt coast.
Quite the contrary, once it has become clear that South Carolina has
taken Lucas' property, it should be left the option to return it to him,
paying him only the damages for the interim taking under the First Eng-
lish doctrine. At that point the state can reconsider whether it wishes to
go through with the taking contemplated under the original BMA once
its obligation to compensate has been established. The solution proposed
here surely benefits both parties, for Lucas now enjoys the return of his
land, while South Carolina regains control over its budget.
VI. CONCLUSION.
The judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court should be re-
versed. Judgment should be entered that the BMA works a taking of
Lucas's land, and the state should have the option of either keeping the
land and paying full market value, or of removing the regulation and
compensating Lucas for his loss of interim use.
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